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Abstract
The consensus view among economists seems to be that a green tax reform is unlikely
to be associated with a "double dividend" (Bovenberg 1998). However, the results
derived in the present paper suggest that this view needs to be qualified. We
demonstrate that a green tax reform is likely to be associated with a significant
"double dividend" if the government prior to taking the environmental aspect into
account has adopted a proportional tax structure due to the administrative costs
involved in differentiating commodity tax rates, and if the green tax reform stimulates
the labour supply and has desirable income distributional effects.
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1 Introduction
The "double dividend" question, i.e. whether replacing a tax on labour with taxes on
commodities causing environmental damage will increase social welfare, not only by
internalising the costs of the environmental damage, but also by reducing the
distortionary costs of the tax system, has been considered extensively in the literature.
Based on the idea that the tax revenue obtained from environmental taxes could be
used to reduce pre-existing distortionary taxes, the first contributions suggested that a
green tax reform in general would be associated with a "double dividend". But after a
number of public finance economists, in particular Bovenberg and his co-authors
(Bovenberg and de Mooij 1994a, 1994b, Bovenberg and van der Ploeg 1994a, 1994b,
1998a, 1998b, Bovenberg and Goulder 1997), have extensively considered the
question, it has become clear that the intuition behind the initial suggestion was
flawed by not taking into account the disincentive effect of the environmental taxes
for the supply of primary factors. Now, the consensus view among economists seems
to be that a green tax reform is unlikely to generate a significant "double dividend", if
previous policies have been economically rational.
The main motivation for the present paper is to challenge this view. Firstly and
fundamentally, by demonstrating that the standard theoretical public finance analysis
by disregarding the importance of administrative costs for the optimal tax structure,
unduly rules out the potential for a green tax reform to be associated with a "double
dividend". Secondly, by arguing that to be relevant in the context of actual policy
making, as it was initially intended, the "double dividend" concept should be defined
to reflect not only the change in distortionary costs of taxation, but also the
distributional consequences of a green tax reform. The potential of a "double
dividend" does not depend on taking the distributional aspect into account, and is in
itself not sufficient for a "double dividend" to materialise, but it increases
considerably the number of cases where a green tax reform will be associated with a
"double dividend".
Goulder (1995) defines "the double dividend" (in the context of the so-called "strong
"double dividend" proposition") as the negative of the "reduction in individual
welfare, abstracting from the welfare effect from changes in environmental quality"
assuming a revenue neutral substitution of the environmental tax with "typical or
representative distortionary taxes". He justifies his definition by the fact that policy-
makers who are interested in a green tax reform are often frustrated with the
complexities of evaluating such reforms. If a policy-maker could assume that the net
benefits due to other factors than the direct environmental effects and the
administrative costs of regulation were non-negative, then his task would be reduced
to argue that the benefits due to these direct effects were positive, and thus be
considerably simplified. This justification suggests that the task of the decision-maker
would be facilitated by the identification of conditions which, when satisfied, would
assure a positive net benefit of the tax changes not only due to reduction in the
distortionary costs of taxation but also due to improvement of the income distribution.
But although it is clear from Sandmo 1975's seminal contribution to the analysis of
the optimal taxation and tax reform in the presence of externalities that distributional
effects are important for the optimal solution, this aspect is not taken into account in
Goulder's definition. In a contemporaneous contribution Proost and Van Regemorter2
(1995) pointed out the limitation of basing the definition of the "double dividend" on
the efficiency aspect only, and suggested a generalisation of the concept to include
also the distributional benefits of the tax changes. Nevertheless it seems that Goulder
(1995) in the economic literature remains the standard reference with respect to the
definition of the "double dividend". Bovenberg (1998) for example reviews the
"double dividend" discussion based on this definition.
Welfare economic analysis of optimal taxation and project evaluation in the presence
of externalities is as other areas of second best welfare economics complex and the
results not always intuitive. However, the understanding of the theoretical results is
often facilitated by considering an example which, although illustrative, refer to a
concrete real life situation. To support the interpretation of the theoretical analysis we
therefore provide a quantitative analysis of why a green tax reform, which involves
the introduction of a differentiated tax on leisure travel, is likely to be associated with
a significant "double dividend".
The paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we formulate mathematically the
government's maximisation problem subject to conditions which include restrictions
on the set of feasible tax instruments to reflect the administrative costs associated with
their use. In Section 3, we define the "the double dividend" of a "green tax reform"
and derive an approximate criteria for the "double dividend" to be positive. After
having briefly reviewed relevant results of the theory of optimal taxation, we identify
conditions conducive to a green tax reform being associated with a "double dividend".
In Section 4, we support the insight gained in the theoretical analysis by simulation
results produced with the help of an illustrative CGE model, which satisfy the
conditions identified. A final section summarises and concludes the paper suggesting
promising avenues for future research. The specification of the CGE model and
details on the simulation results are contained in Annex.
2 The model
We consider a closed economy operating under conditions of perfect competition with
a large number of households, a large number of firms and a government. The
government adheres to egalitarian value judgements and maximises social welfare
defined accordingly, subject to the constraints imposed by the structure of the
economy. The households have different skill levels, but supply only one
homogeneous primary factor, labour. They demand two produced commodities, a
“dirty good", which is associated with external diseconomies, and a “clean good",
which is not.
1 We assume that only the aggregate level of the consumption of the
"dirty good" - not its distribution among households - matters. The production side of
the economy is represented by two constant returns to scale production sectors, each
producing one output and using only labour as input. Government consumption is
exogenous, except for the costs associated with tax administration. For the usual
                                               
1 To facilitate the exposition only two rather than a greater number of produced commodities are
considered. However, a notation has been used to facilitate the comparison with the case of many
commodities as e.g. in Sandmo (1975).3
reasons (see Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980, p357), we do not consider the optimal
differentiation of lump-sum taxes among households as a realistic option for the
government. Based on similar considerations, but more unconventionally, we
furthermore assume that the administrative costs of tax administration depend on the
complexity of the tax structure, more specifically that a proportional tax structure in
the form of a proportional income tax (wage tax) or a uniform commodity tax, are the
administratively least costly tax systems, requiring the government to gather and
process less information than in the case of alternative tax systems. Which tax system
the government chooses, a wage tax, a VAT, a linear income tax, or an income tax
combined with differentiated commodity taxes, is thus not given a priori, but depends
on the administrative costs involved.
Households are labelled h˛(1,.,H)”H, labour 0, the "dirty good" and the "clean good"
i˛(1,2)”C. Households face consumer prices,  ( ) 2 1 0, ,q q q ” q  and firms face producer
prices  ( ) 2 1 0, ,p p p ” p . We assume that all households have the same time endowment,
but differ in productivity, i.e. that the net demand of labour for the h
th household is
h x0 =- ) ( 0 0
h h c ù - y , where  0 w  is the time endowment, 
h c0 the consumption of leisure,
and 
h y  an index of labour productivity. The h
th household's net demand vector is
denoted by  ( )
h h h ,x x x 2 1 0 , ”
h x  and its preferences are represented by  ( ) e u , u =
h h h x
where e represents the public good externality. The corresponding indirect utility
function is expressed by  ) , , ( v
h h I e q , where 
h I  represents unearned income. For each
household  ( )
h h e, , u q qx  =  ) , , ( E
h h u e q  where  ( )
h h , , u e q x  is the vector of
compensated demand functions and  ) , , ( E
h h u e q , the expenditure function, which
indicates the minimum level of expenditure at which the utility level 
h u can be
achieved at the household prices q and at the level of the public good externality e.
The h
th household's valuation in monetary terms of a marginal increase in the
externality is thus -
h
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The functional relationship between the externality and the aggregate consumption of











We assume a linear production structure and perfect competition. By the appropriate
choice of units and by choosing  labour as numeraire, we can therefore without loss of
generality assume all producer prices to be equal to 1, i.e.  ( ) ) 1 , 1 , 1 ( , 2 1 0 = = ,p p p p .
The government's expenditures, A, are financed by commodity taxes,  p q t - ” , and a
uniform lump-sum tax, T. Thus, unearned income is for all households equal to the
uniform lump-sum tax
2, i.e. 
h I =-T. A(q,p) indicate how A depend on the tax
structure; A(q,p) is homogeneous of degree zero in q, equal to  ) ( A p  for  2 1 t t = , and
equal to  ) ( A p + ) ( A p D  for  2 1 t t „ .
3  ) ( A p D  may therefore be interpreted as the extra
administrative costs of a differentiated compared to a proportional tax structure.
The government's preferences are expressed by an individualistic, Pareto social
welfare function W= ( )
H 2 1 ,..,u ,u u W . Using the expenditure function approach (as for
example in Munk 1978), we may therefore specify the government's problem in terms
of the maximisation of social welfare with respect to T, q, e and  ( )
H 2 1 ,..,u ,u u = u
4,
subject to the following constraints:
1)  T u e
h h - = ) , ( E q, , h˛H, which says that the levels of individual utility
must be consistent with the level of unearned income, i.e.  T I
h - = . These
constraints rule out individualised lump-sum transfers, but allow for a linear
income tax.










i u e t q p q, +HT, which may be interpreted as the
government's budget constraint. This constraint represents the three sets of
general equilibrium conditions, i.e. the conditions for profit maximisation,
utility maximisation and material balance.
                                               
2 T is negative if it is interpreted as the fixed element in a progressive linear income tax schedule.
3 The administrative costs of tax administration consist of the costs of tax collection and the costs of tax
enforcement. They are therefore likely to depend on both the complexity of the tax system and the level
of the tax rates. We abstract , however, for the sake of simplicity from the dependence of the
administrative costs on the level of the tax rates, since it is not relevant for points we are going to make
in this paper.
4 Only T and t are the policy instruments. Since producer prices are fixed choosing consumer prices,
t p q + ” , corresponds to choosing t. The household utilities, u, and the externality, e, are included in
the set of controls to facilitate the interpretation of the first order conditions by providing expressions
for the easy derivation of the net marginal social welfare of income, 
h m , and for the social value of a
marginal increase in the externality, r .5








h u e e , , E e
h
1 q , which represents the relation between the level of
the public good externality and the levels of consumer prices and individual
utilities, and
4)  1 1 2 2 p q p q - = - . This constraint represents the restrictions on the
government's choice of commodity tax rates when, compared to a proportional
tax structure, differentiating the commodity tax rates, the benefits in terms of
lower distortionary costs of taxation and a more desirable income distribution
are smaller than the extra administrative costs,  ) ( A p D .
To find the optimal tax structure the government therefore has to solve two
maximisation problems. The first to maximise social welfare subject to the constraints
1-3, and the second subject to the constraints 1-4. The optimal tax structure is then
that of the two solutions which is associated with the largest level of social welfare.
The Lagrangian corresponding to the government's maximisation problem may, in the
first case where and A(q,p) = ) ( A p + ) ( A p D , be written as
1 L ( )
H 2 1 ,..,u ,u u W =
+￿
˛H h
h m ( ) ) , (







- + l ￿ ￿
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h e u e e , , E
h
1 q (1)
and in the second case where A(q,p) = ) ( A p , as
2 L =
1 L + g ( ) 1 2 q q -   (2)
From the first order conditions with respect to 
























1u E  = 0 (3)
and using that 
h




































































” b  is the marginal social value of income for household h. We may
thus interpret 
h m , in analogy with Diamond 1975's net marginal social value of6
income for household h, as the increase in social welfare if the income of the h
th
household were increased by one unit from outside the economy.
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-r = 0 (6)
from which we may obtain the following expression for the social value of a marginal
increase in the public good externality







































b , is the social value of a marginal increase










t , is the opportunity cost value of the change in tax revenue due to













, may be interpreted as an adjustment, taking into account the
effect on the demand for the "dirty good" of the change in the externality, to the
partial social welfare effect of an increase in the externality in order to get the total
effect.











 + lH = 0' (8)
Substituting for 
h m we have when a linear income tax is feasible that the opportunity
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E = 0 (12)
3 Optimal tax structure and green tax reform
3.1 The optimal tax structure.
Criteria for desirable tax reforms are closely linked to the conditions for an optimal
tax structure (see Dixit 1975). As background for the subsequent analysis of
conditions, which guarantee a "double dividend" of a green tax reform, we therefore
briefly summarise the basic insight of optimal commodity tax analysis in the case
where there are no externalities and no restrictions on the government's choice of
commodity tax rates.
In an economy with only one representative household all commodities must be
discouraged at the same rate (see Ramsey 1927). In the case of only two produced
commodities, the commodity, which is more complementary with leisure and for
which an increase in the tax rate will therefore provide a relatively small
encouragement to the consumption of leisure, will be taxed at a higher rate (see
Corlett and Hague 1953). In the special and unrealistic case of leisure being separable
from consumption, the optimal tax structure is proportional (see Deaton 1981). In an
economy with many households the discouragement is, other things being equal,
relatively low for commodities with relatively high income elasticity, and vice versa.
The actual tax structure depends, however, if tax revenue is raised by an income tax
crucially on its characteristics. When the government's revenue requirement is
financed by a linear income tax, then, general speaking, normal goods will be taxed
whereas inferior goods will be subsidised. When the government's revenue
requirement is financed by a proportional income tax (i.e. T constrained to be zero),
then, general speaking, goods with an income elasticity above 1 will be taxed,
whereas not only inferior goods, but also normal goods with an income-elasticity
sufficiently below 1 (how much below will depend on opportunity costs of
government funds,l) will be subsidised (see Munk 1977).8
3.2 Green tax reform and the "double dividend"
Definitions should be judged on whether they are helpful or not in the context where
they are to be used. We assume, following Goulder (1995), that the ultimate purpose
of defining the "double dividend" is for the definition to be useful in the context of
providing advice to policy-makers who consider implementing a green tax reform, i.e.
in situations where a policy-maker has become aware of some environmental effects
and is considering whether it is worthwhile to change the tax structure to internalise
these effects. An example is the realisation by policy-makers of the potential damage
of CO2 pollution in the late 80es. It was in this context that the term the "double
dividend" was first used by Pearce (1991) in suggesting that a tax on CO2 emission
would not only discourage environmental damage, but also produce a "double
dividend" by reducing the distortionary costs of the tax system.
We assume that household behaviour before and after people have become aware of
the environmental damage associated with the consumption of the "dirty good" is the
same. We therefore represent the social preference before the change in awareness of
the environmental effects by
( ) { } ( ) H I e v W W
h h ˛ = h , , , ~ ~






=0 for all  H ˛ h (13)
and (consistent with the formulation in Section 2) after by
W= ( ) { } ( ) H I e v W






<0 for all  H ˛ h (14)
Based on these social welfare functions we then define a green tax reform
( )
G G D D T , t , as the tax changes transforming the initial tax structure, (t
I, T
I), which is
optimal when no value is attached to the external effects, i.e. when based on
( ) { } ( ) H I e v W W
h h ˛ = h , , , ~ ~
q , into the tax structure, (t
*, T
*), which is optimal when
environmental damage is taken into account, i.e. when based on
( ) { } ( ) H I e v W
h h ˛ h , , , q .
The change in social welfare associated with the green tax reform may therefore be
expressed as
” D
G W ( ) ( ) { } ( ) H T T e v W
h ˛ - h   , * , * *, * *, q q  -  ( ) ( ) { } ( ) H T T e v W
I I I I I h ˛ - h   , , , , q q (15)
We divide 
G DW  into two dividends: the "first dividend", D1, being the change in
social welfare due to the decrease in the externality,  ” D
G e ( ) * *, * T e q  -  ( )
I I I T e , q ,
net of the increase in the administrative costs,  A D , if any
5; and the "second dividend",
D2, being the residual change in social welfare due to changes in the distortionary
costs of taxation and in the distribution of income. The distinction is based on the
                                               
5 We assume  A D to be equal to zero if the tax rate of the "dirty good" differs from that of the "clean
good" already before the green tax reform.9
assumption that the "first dividend" is relative easy to estimate or at least to
conceptualise, whereas the "second dividend", especially for non-economists, is much
more difficult to evaluate. We define a green tax reform to be associated with a
"double dividend" if the "second dividend" is positive.
When becoming aware of the importance of environmental effects, policy-makers are
often, as pointed out by Goulder (1995), frustrated by the complexities of evaluating
green tax reforms due to the difficulty in evaluating the "second dividend". If a
policy-maker could assume that the benefits due to other factors than the
improvement in environmental quality and the increase in the costs of regulation were
non-negative, then his task would be much simpler. In other words, the identification
of conditions which would assure that the green tax reform were associated with a
"double dividend", as defined here, would potentially facilitate the task of the
decision-maker considerably.
Note that, although motivated by the same general objective, our definition differs
from the one due to Goulder in taking the distributional aspect into account
6. The
definition is therefore, in our opinion, more relevant to policy-makers, and also more
consistent with their decision-making process. Efficiency gains cannot be separated
from distributional gains when cost-free individualised lump-sum transfers are not
possible, which in fact they never are. Since, as pointed out by Proost and Van
Regemorter (1995), and recognised by Bovenberg (1998), almost all governments
behave as if they were inequality-averse - a definition of the "double dividend" which
does not take this into account seems therefore, if properly understood by policy-
makers, not to be pertinent, and, if not properly understood, potentially misleading. A
rational policy-maker should design a green tax reform taking into account his
distributional preferences. If he uses a definition of the "double dividend" based only
on efficiency considerations, he may easily be misled to evaluate the effects of the tax
changes as if he were inequality-neutral, which in general would be inconsistent with
his preferences.
In order to identify conditions, which will assure a positive "double dividend" it is
helpful to consider a first order approximation of the change in social welfare due to a
green tax reform. We consider the case where before the green tax reform due to the
administrative costs of differentiated tax rates the commodities are taxed at the same
rate. A uniform commodity tax is equivalent to a wage tax; we may therefore, without
loss of generality, assume that, prior to reform, the commodity tax rates are zero, i.e.
1,2 i for      0 = = i t , and limit ourselves to consider tax reforms where the labour tax rate
remain constant, i.e. 
I t t
0 0 = . The green tax reform releases the tax constraints, and
thus increases the administrative costs by    A D . We also assume that the initial tax
structure either has been optimised with respect to the lump-sum tax, T, or that T
remains unchanged in real terms. In the case of a proportional income tax the change
in tax revenue by increasing the tax on the "dirty good" to internalise the externality is
therefore balanced by changing the tax rate on the "clean good", whereas in the case
of a linear income tax the green tax reform may also involve a change in T.
                                               
6 It also differs in assuming that policy-makers, interested in this type of measure, are rational.10
The change in social welfare due to a green tax reform may, given these assumptions,
by properties of Lagrangian multipliers be approximated by
G DW ˆ   ” ) -   ( 2 1
G G D D g t t -  A D l (16)
The first element on the right-hand side of the equality sign represents the benefit of
differentiating the tax structure. The second element is the opportunity cost value of
the administrative costs associated with the differentiated rather than a uniform
commodity tax
7.
From the first order conditions for an optimal tax structure with respect to  1 q  and  2 q ,
(11) and 12), we obtain the following expression for the opportunity costs value of the
tax constraint:
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r 12 E ) (17)
Substituting for    g ,
h m and r, and collecting terms we have (see Technical Appendix)
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G D k t (18)
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¶ 1 G D k t  the first order approximation of the change in the
externality due to the green tax reform.
3.3 Conditions conducive to a positive "double dividend"
Using the framework thus established, we in this section first explain why, as in the
standard analysis of the "double dividend" question, ignoring the importance of
administrative costs for the optimal tax structure leads to the view that the "double
dividend" is always negative. We then briefly restate the case why it is realistic to
expect that the tax structure prior to a green tax reform is restricted by administrative
costs, and based on this assumption move on to identify conditions under which a
green tax reform will be associated with a "double dividend".
                                               
7 The criteria thus take into account that the increased administrative costs will have to be financed by
distortionary taxation.11
It follows from a simple argument that if the tax constraint is non-binding before a
green tax reform, i.e. where the social welfare function attaches no value to the
change in the externality, then the "double dividend" is non-positive. If the tax
structure before the green tax reform is optimal given the social welfare function,
( ) { } ( ) H I e v W
h h ˛ h , , , ~ q , then the change in social welfare due to any feasible tax
reform, including the green tax reform, ( )
G G D D T , t , must by definition be non-
positive, i.e.  0
~
£ DW . However,  W
~
D  is when the tax constraint is non-binding equal
to the second dividend calculated based on  ( ) { } ( ) H I e v W
h h ˛ h , , , q . A green tax
reform will therefore, when prior to reform the tax constraint is non-binding, never be
associated with a "double dividend".
There are two reasons why the tax constraint may be non-binding prior to a green tax
reform. First, that the optimal tax structure is proportional, even disregarding the
costs of differentiating the tax structure. In an economy with only one representative
consumer where consumption is separable from leisure, as the one considered in
Bovenberg (1998), this is the case. In such an economy, when no value is attached to
the externality, a proportional tax structure is the optimal solution to the government's
maximisation problem. Therefore the tax constraint will not be binding. Replacing a
wage tax by a uniform commodity tax does not change the allocation, and
differentiating the commodity tax structure to decrease the externality will in this case
discourage the supply of labour and hence increase the distortionary costs of taxation.
A green tax reform, which replaces a wage-tax with a differentiated commodity tax
structure to internalise the externality, will therefore not be associated with a "double
dividend". The second reason why the tax constraint may not be binding prior to a
green tax reform, is that it has been optimal to differentiate the tax structure already
before taking the environmental aspect into account, i.e. that the administrative costs
needed to differentiate the tax rates have already been incurred prior to the
implementation of the green tax reform.
However, in the context of providing relevant policy advice to conclude on this basis
that a green tax reform will never be associated with a "double dividend", is clearly to
go too far. To assume that consumption is separable from leisure is a very restrictive
assumption, and in a many household economy far from sufficient for a proportional
tax structure to be optimal. There are in fact no convincing justification for assuming
that a proportional tax structure should be optimal, other than the administrative costs
for such a tax structure are lower than those of a differentiated tax structure. It
therefore reasonable to expect that prior to a green tax reform the administrative costs
involved in differentiating commodity tax rates in many cases constrain the tax
structure to be proportional. It is therefore relevant, according to the justification
provided above, in the context of defining the "double dividend", to try to identify
conditions conducive to a green tax reform being associated with a "double dividend"
based on this assumption. To do that, we use the first order approximation of the
change in social welfare due to a green tax reform, derived in the previous section.
Based on the definition provided above, the "first dividend" of the green tax reform
may be approximated by








G De ˆ (19)12
and the "second dividend", therefore by
2 ˆ D     ”





h   b
G De ˆ - A D l ) (20)
or by substituting for 
G DW ˆ  using (16), by
2 ˆ D  = ) -   ( 2 1








G De ˆ (21)
and using (18), by
2 ˆ D     ” 0 t l (￿
˛C k
k E0  
G D k t +  e E0
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        +￿
˛C k
k X ) R - ( k l  
G D k t (22)
Based on (22),  2 ˆ D " may be divided into two elements, 1 . 2 ˆ D  and  2 . 2 ˆ D :
1) The approximation of change in social welfare due to the change in the
distortionary cost of taxation,
1 . 2 ˆ D = 0 t l (￿
˛C k
k E0  
G D k t +  e E0




















G De ˆ ) (23)
is the sum of two main effects, represented  by the two brackets in (23). The last
bracket represents the income effect. Assuming that leisure is a normal good this
effect will tend to have the same sign as the change in social welfare and can therefore
be disregarded in determining the sign of the change in social welfare
8. The sign of
the change in social welfare is thus in general determined by the first bracket: the
change in tax revenue caused by the change in the supply of the labour 1) due to the
induced decrease in the externality,  e E t 0 0
G De ˆ , and 2) due to the change in tax rates
directly,    ￿
˛C k
k E t 0 0  
G D k t . If the decrease in the externality increases the supply of
labour, i.e. if    ˆ 0 0
G De E t e >0, it contributes to an increased social welfare; if the
opposite is the case, it decreases social welfare. The direct effect of the change in the
tax rates on the labour supply,    ￿
˛C k
k E t 0 0  
G D k t , will only be positive if the
consumption of the "dirty good" is complementary to leisure. In this case a move from
a proportional tax structure to a tax structure in which the "dirty good" is taxed at a
higher rate than the "clean good", will decrease the costs of taxation and thus, ceteris
paribus, increase social welfare. This is consistent with the commodity, the
consumption of which is more complementary with leisure and for which an increase
in the optimal tax rate will therefore provide a relatively small encouragement to the
consumption of leisure, based on efficiency considerations alone will be taxed at a
higher rate (cf. Corlett and Hague 1953).
                                               
8 The effect will strictly have the same sign as the change in social welfare in the case of a one
household economy such as the one considered in Bovenberg (1998).13
2) The approximation of the change in social welfare due to income distributional
effects (due to the changes in tax rates without taking the change in the externality
into account)
2 . 2 ˆ D =￿
˛C k
k X ) R - ( k l  
G D k t (24)
which is positive if the value of the tax payments valued by distributional
characteristics is greater than when valued at the opportunity cost of government
funds. When the government's revenue requirement is financed by a linear income
tax, we have from the first order conditions with respect to T , (10), that
  l =b
v














. If the "dirty good" is a normal good,  b <
v
1 R . Therefore if
the government can raise tax revenue by a linear income tax,  2 . 2 ˆ D  will, in general, be
positive if the income elasticity of the "dirty good" is greater than zero. If the
government is constrained to raise income tax revenue by a proportional income tax
2 . 2 ˆ D  will, in general, be positive if  2 1 R R < , i.e. if the income elasticity of the "dirty
good" is greater than one.
To summarise, if the tax structure prior to the green tax reform has been proportional
due to administrative costs, then the following two conditions are sufficient for a
green tax reform to be associated with a positive "double dividend":
First, that the tax shift and the resulting change in the externality discourage the
consumption of leisure. This will be the case if the "dirty good" and the externality are
complementary to leisure.
Secondly, that the tax shift improves the distribution of income (leaving aside the
income distributional effects of the change in the externality). Generally speaking,
this will be more likely to be the case the more the "dirty good" consumed by the
"rich". Whether the tax shift will improve the distribution of income or not depends
critically on the type of income tax used, for example whether it is a wage tax or a
linear income tax.
4 A quantitative illustration
To support the insight gained in the theoretical analysis we provide a quantitative
illustration taking as an example a green tax reform to internalise the externalities
associated with leisure travel. The results are derived from an illustrative CGE model
which is documented in the Annex together with the details of the simulation results.
As seems reasonable in the case of leisure travel, we assume that the share of income
spent on the "dirty good", i.e. leisure travel, for high income households is greater
than for low income households, and that the time spent consuming the "dirty good",
is relatively more important than for consumption in general. We assume that the
households' evaluation of the environmental damage associated with the consumption14
of leisure travel is proportional to household income, and that the externality is
separable from the consumption of final commodities and leisure. The extra
administrative costs of a differentiated tax structure are assumed to be 100 units
greater than of a proportional tax structure
9. Finally, we assume that the government
is inequality-averse, attaching the double value to an increase in the income of low-
income households compared to that of high-income households. The opportunity
costs of government funds are 1.4 (1.3. if the government is alternatively assumed to
be inequality-neutral).
When the externality is not taken into account, the administrative costs make it
unattractive to differentiate the tax structure although this would significantly reduce
the distortionary costs of tax collection and have positive income distributional
effects, given the parameter values which have been chosen (see Annex, Table 3,
Column (2) and (3)). However, both for an inequality-neutral and an inequality-averse
government a differential tax on leisure travel becomes desirable when the
environmental benefits are taken into account (see Annex Table 3, Column (3) and
(4)).
Table 1. The initial tax structure constrained by administrative costs.
Inequality- neutral  Inequality- averse
First dividend, D1, of which -24 -2
- Environmental benefits 106 138
- Administrative costs -130 -140
Second dividend, D2 33 122
Change in social welfare 9 120
Source: Illustrative CGE model, Annex, Table 3
Table 2. The initial tax structure not constrained by administrative costs.
Inequality- neutral  Inequality- averse
First dividend, D1 33 30
Second dividend, D2 -17 -14
Change in Social welfare 16 16
Source: Illustrative CGE model, Annex, Table 3
Tables 1 and 2 report the simulation results in terms of the change in social value
broken down on the "first dividend" and the "second dividend" assuming,
respectively, that the initial tax structure is constrained by administrative costs, and
that it is not.
We see that in the case where the green tax reform involves a change in
administrative costs (Table 1), both for an inequality-neutral and an inequality-averse
government the "double dividend" is significant compared to the environmental
benefits. The "double dividend" for an inequality-averse government is at 122
relatively more important than for an inequality-neutral government where it is only
                                               
9 For reference the GNP is 161.670, household consumption of leisure travel, 5.000, of other goods,
92.000 and government consumption, 64.670 ( see Annex, Table 1)15
33.  This illustrates that the scope for a significant "double dividend" is larger when
the distributional aspect is taken into account than when it is not.
However in the case where there are no administrative costs (Table 2) there are no
"double dividend". The simulation results thus also illustrate the crucial role played
by the assumptions concerning administration costs.
It would be easy to provide an example where the "double dividend" is positive for an
inequality-averse policy-maker, but negative if only the efficiency gains are taken into
account. The simulation model may thus also illustrate the potential confusion which
defining the "double dividend", based only on the effect of the distortionary costs of
taxation, may create.
5 Summary and concluding remarks
With respect to the likelihood of a green tax reform generating a significant "double
dividend", the analysis has confirmed the prevailing opinion among economists to the
extent that there is no presumption, even taking administrative costs into account, that
a shift from indirect taxation to direct taxation with the objective of internalising
environmental externalities, is likely, in general, to generate a "double dividend". If
the optimal tax structure has been differentiated to exploit the benefits in terms of
reduction of distortionary costs of taxation and a more desirable income distribution,
the "double dividend", as defined in this paper (and in Goulder 1995), will be
negative. However, the analysis has also shown that in those cases where
environmental objectives, on the one hand, and the objectives of a more desirable
income distribution and of reducing the distortionary costs of taxation, on the other
hand, justify tax changes going in the same direction, but where the benefits, based on
the second set of objectives taken in isolation, are too small to justify the
administrative costs of a differentiated tax structure, a significant "double dividend"
may be a realistic possibility. In practice, it is undoubtedly quite common prior to a
green tax reform for "dirty goods", for administrative reasons to be taxed at the same
rate as a large number of "clean goods". The results established in this paper are
therefore not only of theoretical interest, but also, in the context of decision-making
on environmental policies, of considerable relevance in practice.
Furthermore, the paper has demonstrated that the "expenditure function approach" in
the case of externalities, as in other areas of public economics, facilitates the analysis
of optimal taxation and project evaluation. The presence of externalities provides a
supplementary reason why taking administrative costs into account can significantly
modify the optimal tax structure and criteria for project evaluation. We have in this
paper focused on how to integrate the administrative costs of alternative regulatory
regimes in the theoretical analysis in the simplest way possible, and therefore have
deliberately based the analysis on the well-known standard model with only one
primary factor. The simple model prevents, however, certain important issues from
being considered, such as for example whether a desirable green tax reform in taking
administrative costs of alternative regulatory regimes and income distributional
effects into account is likely to create productive inefficiency, and how governments16
should provide support to alleviate pain of structural adjustment to industries
particularly affected by environmental policy changes. However, these issues may be
analysed extending the framework to represent more than one primary factor, and
sectors with decreasing returns to scale, (see Munk 1980 and 1998). Such an
extension of the analysis seems of particular interest in the context of the ongoing
search among economists and political decision-makers for ways to reform the tax-
transfer system to provide income support and increased employment opportunities
for low-skilled workers disadvantaged by globalisation and technological change.
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Technical Appendix:
 Derivation of approximation of change in welfare due to
green tax reform
Substituting for    g in (16) we have
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 we get the following approximation of
change in welfare due to a green tax reform
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Annex : Illustrative CGE model
Introduction
In this note we document a CGE model, which has been specified to satisfy the
conditions for the "double dividend" to be positive, and report simulation results to
illustrate that a green tax reform may generate a significant double dividend, even if
the government policies prior to taking the environmental aspect into account have
been economically rational. The CGE model has a number of characteristics which, in
our opinion, are essential in order for a CGE model to be used to address the issues of
a green tax reform in a politically relevant way. Though simple, the CGE model
provides a flexible representation of the interaction between the consumption and
leisure for the various commodities. It allows the differences in administrative costs
of different regulatory regimes to be taken into account, as well as the distributional
consequences of tax changes by representing the household sector by two types of
households, a low-skilled households and a high-skilled household, where the
government attaches higher social welfare weights to the income of the former than of
the latter.
Specification of the CGE model
For optimal tax analyses, the most important aspect of constructing a CGE model is in
general the specification of household preferences. Often CGE models are based on
assumptions that make them unsuited for optimal tax analyses. Often an economy
with only one type of household is considered, and labour supply is assumed either to
be fixed, or, if endogenous, preferences are assumed to be homothetic with the
consumption of produced goods being separable from the consumption of leisure.
These assumptions imply, as we have seen (Section 3.1), that a proportional tax
structure is optimal. There are no compelling evidence for justifying these
assumptions, rather the contrary ( see for example Myles 1995). They may facilitate
the theoretical analysis and model construction considerably, and for some purposes
they may represent a justifiable simplification of reality. However, this is seldom the
case in second-best welfare economic analyses where they may indeed lead to
conclusions which in a practical political context are grossly misleading with respect
to what constitutes the optimal tax structure and desirable directions of policy reform.
The analysis of green policy reform is by no means an exception in this respect. The
methodology pioneered by Perroni and Rutherford (1995) and the corresponding
computational technique (Rutherford 1994) which have been adopted here to specify
household preferences avoid the pitfalls of making such assumptions.
The following supplementary assumptions have been made to specify the CGE
model:2
The household utility functions,  ( ) e u ,
h h x , are assumed to take the form
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) e E c c x C c x C C U u
h
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pure leisure, i.e. the amount of time spent on activities which do not involve the
consumption of purchased commodities. The elasticity, 
h L. s , expresses for each
household the substitution between aggregate consumption 




h D. s  is the elasticity of substitution between the two composite goods 
h C1 and 
h C2 ,
and 
h Ci. s  the elasticity of substitution between the amount purchased of the
commodity i, 
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therefore is the time spent supplying labour to the market. The supply of labour in
efficiency units (measured negatively) is 
h x0 =
h hz0 y - , where 
h y  is an indicator of
labour productivity. The budget constraint for the h
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, where 
h q0 = 0 q
h y  is the hourly after-tax
wage rate and 
h h h h I z q Y + = 0 0 is household income. This specification allows
household preferences defined over marketed commodities and labour,  ( ) e u ,
h h x , to
represent different degrees of complementarity of the two purchased commodities
with "leisure" in the sense of non-market spending of time, i.e. 
h
C i
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The real income, 
h RI , of the h
th household is defined to be equal to its income in the
benchmark situation, 
0 . h Y , plus the equivalent variation of the policy change, i.e.
h RI =
0 . h Y + ( ) ) , , ( , ,
0 0 h h h I e v e E q q -
0 . h I
In the case of an inequality-adverse government, the social welfare weight assigned to
the real income of the low-skilled households is twice that of the high-skilled
households. Assuming that the number of low-skilled and high-skilled households are
the same, the criteria for policy change to be desirable for an inequality-neutral








                                               
10 Note that this utility function is a special case of the utility function defined on market transactions,
( ) e , u
h h x , on which the theoretical analysis is based. The results generated by the CGE model are
therefore by assumption consistent with any result derived from the theoretical model. The externality
has been assumed to be additively separable with a constant marginal utility. This assumption is not
realistic, but that is of little importance for the points we want to illustrate here.3
The benchmark data set on which the CGE model is calibrated is provided in the form
of a Social Accountancy Matrix (SAM) (see Table 1).
The functional form for how the externality is related to the households' consumption





h x e 1
Table 1 The state of the economy prior to the green tax reform in the form of a
SAM
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Total
S1 S1 1 2 1 2 LS HS
S1 5.000 0 5.000 1. Production accounts for
each sector S1 92.000 0 92.000
1 100 4900 5.000 2. Material balance accounts for
each commodity 2 5000 87000 92.000
1 0 0 3. Commodity tax accounts for
each commodity 2 0 0
4. Material balance account for
labour
5.000 92.000 64670 161.670
LS 5.100 5.100 5. Household income -
expenditure accounts HS 91.900 91.900
6. Government budget account 64.670 64.670
Total 5.000 92.000 5.000 92.000 161.670 5.100 91.900 64.670
Note: S1 and S2 indicate production sectors, 1 and 2, "dirty good" and "clean good" respectively, and
LS and HS the low-skilled and high-skilled household's, respectively
The SAM represents 6 types of accounts, in total 10 accounts as indicated in Table 1.
Note that the share of consumption of the dirty good, 
h
1 a , is 2% for the low-skilled
households, but 5% for the high-skilled household and that the governments revenue
requirement is financed by a 40% income tax, which is equivalent to a 66 2/3%
uniform tax on the consumption of the produced commodities.
The parameters of the utility functions are provided in Table 2. For both households
the shares of time spent consuming the "dirty good", and the "clean good" relative to
their share of market purchases, 
h h c 1 0
. 1
0 / ) / ( a w  and 
h h c 0 0
. 2
0 / ) / ( a w , are specified so
that the consumption of the "dirty good" requires relatively more time for its







h L. s 0.50 0.50
h D. s 0.50 0.50
h Ci. s 0.00 0.00
1 0
. 1
0 / ) / ( a w
h c 0.50 0.50
2 0
. 2
0 / ) / ( a w
h c 0.00 0.00
The CGE model has been specified to generate illustrative results, rather than to be
realistic. Elasticities of substitution between leisure and consumption, which
determined the costs of government funds are 1.4, which are in line with those used in
empirical models (see Snow and Warren 1996). The model has been programmed in
GAMS/MPSGE (see Rutherford 1994). The program can be obtained from the author.
Simulation results
The optimal tax structure has been calculated under four different sets of assumptions.
The simulation results in terms of household taxes, government expenditures, supply
of labour, the size of the externality and normative indicators (real income and social
welfare) are provided in Table 3. The initial state of the economy, where the
government's tax revenue is raised by a proportional tax structure (wage tax), is
represented in Column 1. Columns 2 and 3 represent what would be the optimal
solution if the administrative costs of differentiating the tax rates between leisure
travel and other goods where taken as exogenous, when, as has been assumed to be
the case before the green tax reform, the government attach no value to the reduction
in the externality, assuming, respectively that the government is either inequality-
neutral or inequality-averse. Columns 4 and 5 represent the optimal solutions after the
green tax reform under these two alternative assumptions. We see that when the
administrative costs of differentiating the tax rates between the "dirty good" and the
"clean good" are taken into account, then a proportional tax structure, as is in the
initial state of the economy, is the optimal solution: differentiating the tax rates would
when the government is inequality-neutral decrease social welfare by 80 (see
Columns 2), and when the government is inequality-averse by 4 (see Columns 3). In
contrast, a green tax reform will if the government is inequality-neutral increase social
welfare by 9, and under the alternative assumption that it is inequality-averse, by 120.5


























 Labour,  0 t - 40  40  40  40  40
 Leisure travel,  1 t   0 24 37 38 50












 Adm. costs and other gov. exp.   64.670 100 100 100 100
 Opportunity cost value 130 140 130 140
Supply of labour and externality
 Labour   0 X 161.670 273 387 392 503
 Externality e     5.000 -484 -553 -561 712
 Value of reduction in externality   73 108 106 138
Normative indicators attaching no
value to the externality
Disregarding the
externality
Taking externality  into
account
 Real income low-skilled     5.100   61   92   94 123
 Real income high-skilled   91.900 -141 -188 -191 -263
 Social welfare .  -80    -4 -97 -18
Normative indicators attaching
value to the externality
Disregarding the
externality
Taking externality  into
account
 Real income low-skilled   63   95  97 126
 Real income high-skilled -71 -87 -88 -132
 Social welfare  -7 104    9 120
1 Assuming that the administrative costs are exogenous 
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